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Abstract
This paper introduces a simple AS-AD model to examine the de-
terminants of inflation for the members of the West African Economic
and monetary union. On the supply side, we found France’s inflation,
rainfall, and real crude oil inflation to be the most important drivers
of domestic inflation. On the demand side, we found the output gap
to be a significant determinant of domestic inflation. Given the esti-
mated size of the effect of the output gap on inflation, we can conclude
that the short-run aggregate supply curve may be relatively flat; bol-
stering the Keynesian view that monetary policy could be extremely
effective in stabilizing output in the short-run.
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1 Introduction
Price stability remains the most important macroeconomic objective for the
members of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).
While the current peg with the euro has refrained the ability monetary au-
thorities to propagate inflation from the monetary sector, it has been less
effective in preventing inflation feeding from the external sector and produc-
tivity shocks (for example, large swings in rainfall and adverse oil shocks are
all examples valid).
It is vital for a central bank to understand the underlying macroeconomic
forces that affect domestic inflation in order to contain them. Therefore, this
study proposes a simple theoretical model of price determination capable to
identify the driving forces of inflation for the WAEMU so as to provide local
policy makers with further understanding on the causes of inflation in the
WAEMU’zone.
The main proposition in this paper is that the aggregate price level is
determined by an interaction between the forces that affect the aggregate
demand for goods and services and those that affect the ability of firms to
supply these goods and services. On that note, on the supply side, the aggre-
gate supply relation is determined by a price and wage setting relationship
and a production function linked to a productivity factor driven by rainfall.
On the demand side, the aggregate demand relation is determined by an
IS-LM equilibrium.
2 A simple model of price determination
2.1 The aggregate supply side
Let’s assume that in the short-run, each firm employs a certain number of
people given a fixed amount of capital. The firm production function can be
expressed as follow
Yi = K¯iREi
where R denotes rainfall, which is an important factor that drives labor
productivity in most agricultural based economies, 1 Ei denotes the number
1see Kinda (2011)
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of people employed by each firm, and K¯i denotes the stock of capital employed
by each firm, which is one of the factors of production that is expected to be
fixed in the short run. For theoretical simplicity, we assume a homogeneous
cost function. Hence, each producer faces the following cost function
Ci = ((1 + Υ)W )Ei + cK¯i
where Ci denotes the cost function of each firm. This cost function is simply
comprised of a fixed and variable cost. For simplicity, the only variable cost
in this study emanates from labor costs and a mark up (Υ) that each firm
charges over the nominal wage (W ). This mark up can arise as a result
of changes in world energy prices, or other production costs driven by the
sporadic increases in the world price of key fertilizers used in the farming
process. c is the rental cost of capital. We aggregate all production and cost
functions as follow
P = (1/n)
n∑
i=1
Pi
C = (1/n)
n∑
i=1
Ci
the profit maximization problem for the representative firm can be derived
as follow
max
E
Π = PK¯RE − (1 + Υ)WE − cK¯
taking the first order condition with respect to E yields the optimal price
setting condition. Note that since the capital stock is fixed in the short run,
it can be viewed as a constant, such that K¯ = 1. The price setting behavior
of the representative firm would be governed by the following price setting
function
P = P (R,W,Υ) (1)
where rainfall (R) is an exogenous productivity factor that bolsters the abil-
ity of a farm to produce more output. The environment is not entirely
competitive, thus the firm charges a mark up (Υ) over its marginal cost of
production. An increase in the mark up is expected to put upward pressure
on prices. The price setting relation can be linearized as follow
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dP = PWdW + PΥdΥ + PRdR
PW > 0, PΥ > 0, PR < 0
the wage setting relation can defined as follow
W = W (P e, u) (2)
note that because rainfall shocks are unpredictable and difficult to forecast,
they may or may not necessarily impact the wage setting behavior.2 In this
study, we assume that rainfall does not affect wage contracts. u denotes the
unemployment rate, P e is the expected price level. An increase in the unem-
ployment rate should reduce workers’ bargaining power and put downward
pressure on nominal wages (Blanchard, 2005). Expectations about future
increases in the price level should force workers to seek higher wages. The
wage setting relation can be linearized as follow
dW = WP edP
e +Wudu
Wpe > 0, Wu < 0
Okun’s law predicts a negative relationship between real output and the
unemployment rate. This relationship can be expressed in functional form
as follow
u = U(Y ) (3)
where Y denotes aggregate real output. A positive change in real output
should put downward pressure on the unemployment rate. We can linearize
Okun’s law as follow
du = UY dY
UY < 0
2Note that the wage setting equation is quite generic in this study. However, there are
other exogenous factors that may affect the wage setting relation. For instance, changes
in unemployment benefits, or minimum wage requirements are some examples of plausible
exogenous factors that may directly impact wages.
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combining all necessary terms, the inverted short run aggregate supply rela-
tion can be expressed as follow
dP = λ1dP
e + λ2dY + λ3dΥ + λ4dR (4)
λ1 = PWWP e > 0, λ2 = PWWuUY > 0, λ3 = PΥ > 0, λ4 = PR < 0
the slope of the inverted short run aggregate supply relation can be expressed
as follow
dP
dY
= λ2 > 0
the positive sign of slope indicates that the law of supply holds. Therefore,
there should be a positive relationship between changes in real output and
changes in prices.
2.2 The aggregate demand side
The goods market equation can be expressed as follow
Y = Y (i− P ) +NX(Y ∗, Y, ε) +G (5)
Y denotes real aggregate output. NX denotes net exports, which is a func-
tion of a weighted average index of foreign income (Y ∗), domestic output
(Y ), and an exogenous favorable terms of trade variable (ε). G is a purely
exogenous fiscal expenditure factor. The real interest rate (i−P ) affects the
most sensitive components of aggregate demand for domestic output. These
components can be domestic consumption and investment. For theoretical
simplicity, we have assume that the velocity of money is constant. We can
express the monetary equilibrium as follow
M
P
= m(Y, i∗) (6)
where M denotes the nominal money supply which is fairly exogenous in a
fixed exchange rate regime. (P ) is the aggregate price level. The demand for
money is mainly influenced by domestic output and the opportunity cost of
holding domestic bonds, which in this case is the foreign interest rate (i∗).
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Furthermore, the economy is governed by the following covered interest rate
parity condition
i = i∗ + ee
where ee denotes the expected rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate. We are assuming that the central bank operates under a fixed exchange
rate regime. Hence, there is no reason to expect any changes in the spot rate.
Therefore, there is also no reason to formulate any expectation about any
future depreciation of the exchange rate. This assumption can be illustrated
as follow ee = 0. Hence, the interest rate parity condition can be rewritten
as follow
i = i∗ (7)
we insert the interest parity condition into the goods market equation as
follow
Y = Y (i∗ − P ) +NX(Y ∗, Y, ε) +G
we linearize the goods market as follow
dY = Yi∗di
∗ − YPdP +NXY ∗dY ∗ +NXY dY +NXεdε+ dG (8)
Yi∗ < 0, YP > 0, NXY ∗ > 0, NXY < 0, NXε > 0
an increase in the foreign interest rate and the aggregate price level should
reduce the aggregate demand for domestic output. An increase in domestic
output would corroborate to an increase in domestic income and lead to
more imports, thereby decrease net exports. An increase in foreign income
and the world export prices of the country’s main cash crops would improves
net export, ceteris paribus. Let’s linearize (6) as follow
1
P
dM − M
P 2
dP = mi∗di
∗ +mY dY
mi∗ < 0, my > 0
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an increase in the foreign interest rate would lead to a decrease in the do-
mestic demand for money. An increase in domestic output would lead to an
increase in the demand for money. Let’s solve for di∗as follow
di∗ =
(
1
Pmi∗
)
dM −
(
M
P 2mi∗
)
dP −
(
mY
mi∗
)
dY
let’s insert di∗ into dY as follow
dY = Yi∗
[(
1
mi∗
)
dM
P
− (Yi∗M+P 2mi∗YP
P 2mi∗
)dP −
(
mY
mi∗
)
dY
]
+NXY ∗dY
∗ +
NXY dY +NXεdε+ dG
let’s solve for the aggregate demand relation as follow
dY = λ5dM − λ6dP + λ7dY ∗ + λ8dε+ λ9dG (9)
λ5 = Θ
Yi∗
Pmi∗
> 0, λ6 = Θ(
Yi∗M+P 2mi∗YP
P 2mi∗
) > 0, λ7 = ΘNXY ∗ > 0, λ8 =
ΘNXε > 0, λ9 > 0
Θ =
(
mi∗
(1 −NXY )mi∗ + Yi∗mY
)
> 0
the slope of the short run aggregate demand relation can be expressed as
follow
dY
dP
= −λ6 < 0
the negative sign of the slope indicates that the law of demands holds. There-
fore, there should be a negative relationship between changes in output and
changes in prices.
2.3 Comparative Statics
We can express the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves as a
system of linear equations as follow[
1 −λ2
λ6 1
] [
dP
dY
]
=
[
λ1dP
e + λ3dΥ + λ4dR
λ5dM + λ7dY
∗ + λ8dε+ λ9dG
]
(10)
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note that the aggregate supply side is over-identified, because the number of
exogenous demand instruments excluded from the short-run aggregate supply
curve exceeds the number of endogenous variables. Let’s examine the effect
of an exogenous shock in rainfall on the change in the price level
dP
dR
=
λ4
(1 + λ2λ6)
< 0
a positive change in rainfall shifts the short run aggregate supply curve down-
ward, putting downward pressure on prices. Lets say for instance that the
firm’s mark up rises as a result of an increase in energy costs
dP
dΥ
=
λ3
(1 + λ2λ6)
> 0
a positive change in the mark up shifts the short run aggregate supply curve
upward, putting upward pressure on prices.3 Let’s consider the effect of a
positive change in government spending on prices and output
dY
dG
=
λ9
(1 + λ2λ6)
> 0
dP
dG
=
λ2λ9
(1 + λ2λ6)
> 0
an exogenous shock in government spending shifts the short run aggregate
demand curve upward, causing both an increase in the price level and do-
mestic output in the short-run. Let’s examine the effect of a favorable terms
of trade shock (for example, a positive change in the world price of cocoa)
on output as follow
dY
dε
=
λ8
(1 + λ2λ6)
> 0
a favorable terms of trade shock caused by an increase in the export price
of cocoa should cause real output to rise. Given some nominal rigidities, as
farmers’ profits begin to rise, they would be inclined to produce more. That
is the so called law of supply argument.
3Note that in this example, we are assuming that the country in question is a net oil
importer.
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2.4 Empirical methodology
The inverted short-run aggregate supply curve can be expressed as a reduced
form equation as follow
dp =
λ1
(1 + λ2λ6)
dP e+
λ3
(1 + λ2λ6)
dΥ+
λ4
(1 + λ2λ6)
dR+
λ2(λ5dM + λ7dY
∗ + λ8dε+ λ9dG)
(1 + λ2λ6)
(11)
if the goal to estimate (11) directly, note that we already face two visible
econometric issues: output is endogenous and the inverted short-run aggre-
gate supply curve is over-identified. Hence, given the endogeneity of output
and the over-identification issue, we can still obtain the unbiased estimates
of all the parameters expressed in (11) by using the Two Stage Least Squares
estimator specified in (12)
φˆ2sls = (X
′
GG
′
G)−1(X
′
GG
′
G)−1G
′
Y (12)
2.5 Data
We use annual data from 1970 to 2012 to estimate the determinant of inflation
at the one year horizon. Rainfall data were collected from the Center for
Environmental Data Analysis (CEDA) database. Nominal commodity price
data were collected from the Global Economic Monitor (GEM) database.
Macroeconomic data were collected from the World Development Indicators
(WDI) database, the International Finance Statistics (IFS) database, and
the BCEAO database. We collected data for the founding members of the
WAEMU (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and
Togo). Guinea-Bissau was omitted from the analysis, because the country
joined the monetary union in the summer of 1997, so we faced a lack of
historical data.
10
2.5.1 The endogenous variables
The exp-post inflation rate
I used the GDP deflator and the consumer price data as my two proxies
for approximating the aggregate price level for the WAEMU. We calculate
the inflation rate as follow
pit = pt − pt−1
where pt is the log of the GDP deflator or the consumer price index, pit is the
actual inflation rate measured by the first difference of the log of the price
indicator. Figure 1 plots the inflation rate (deflator) series for the WAEMU
overtime. In the case of the WAEMU, although the MA(1) and ARMA(1
1) models provided some good empirical results, modeling inflationary ex-
pectations with the random walk model produced the strongest empirical
estimates. Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the ex-ante inflation
rate and the actual inflation rate (deflator) estimated for the WAEMU.4
4Please refer to Table 8 for unit root tests.
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Figure 1: Inflation (GDP deflator) base year=2010
I used the MA(1), AR(1), and ARMA(1 1) processes to model inflationary
expectations. I used the residuals from the MA(1), AR(1), and ARMA(1 1)
models as my three proxies for the ex-post inflation rate and named them as
follow: (INFARMAD), (INFMAD), and (INFRWD).
12
0
10
20
30
P
er
ce
nt
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Actual Inflation
Expected Inflation AR (1)
Data Source: WDI, author's calculations
Figure 2: Expected inflation versus actual inflation
The real output gap
I used an aggregated index of real GDP expressed in local currency as the
proxy for real output for the WAEMU. I used a similar approach taken by
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) to compute the cyclical component of the index
and used it as my main proxy for the real output gap (ogapt).
5 Figure 3
presents the real output gap series for the WAEMU. We find that the effects
of the Sahel droughts during the early 1980s were strongly correlated across
the countries. Cross correlation of real shocks within a monetary union is a
desirable outcome for monetary policy efficiency.
5Please refer to Table 9 for unit root tests.
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Figure 3: The real output gap (base year=2010)
2.5.2 Exogenous demand instruments
Foreign income proxy
We used nominal GDP data expressed in dollars for the key historical trading
partners (for example, we used the United States, Germany, the Netherlands,
India, China, and France). We converted the series from dollars to CFA
francs and then deflated them by the price level proxy. I used various weights
to create a weighted index of foreign income; note that the United States
was given the highest weight, because it remains the most essential trading
partner for the WAEMU. I used the cyclical component of the index as
14
my main proxy for world demand (wogapDt).
6 Figure 4 shows a strong
correlation between nominal economic activities proxy by the nominal GDP
gap and our proxy for world demand.
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Figure 4: Co-movements: nominal economic activities (nominal GDP gap)
and world demand (Key trading partners)
We see a strong correlation between the economic crisis of 1988-1993 and
the collapse in world demand associated with the exact period. Furthermore,
we can see that world demand was weak prior the devaluation of the CFA
franc, but not surprisingly we observe a significant surge in world demand
after the devaluation of CFA franc in 1994. The surge in world demand
following the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 is an expected outcome
6Please refer to Table 9 for unit root tests.
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since the price of the domestic currency fell. The stoutness of the correla-
tion between the nominal GDP gap and world demand can only bolster the
robustness of our world demand indicator.
Export price proxies
I used the world prices of three key commodities: cocoa, cotton, and tobacco.
The prices were converted into CFA franc and deflated by a price level proxy.
I used the cyclical component of real cocoa prices as my real cocoa price
surprise indicator (cocoasDt). I used the cyclical component of real tobacco
prices as my real tobacco price surprise indicator (tabasDt).
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Figure 5: Commodities price indicators for the WAEMU-7: real cocoa price
surprise (cocoasDt), real tobacco price surprise (tabasDt), real cotton price
surprise (cottonsDt), and the log of the commodity price index (compexDt)
I used the cyclical component of real cotton prices as my real cotton price
surprise indicator (cottonsDt). I created a real commodity price index by
using a weighted average price index based on real cocoa prices, real cotton
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prices, and real tobacco prices. I used the log of this index as my main
commodity price index (compexDt). The index followed a random walk and
was stationary at levels, which shows that real commodity prices remain
highly unpredictable for the WAEMU. Figure 5 depicts the movements of
the four export price proxies overtime.
Fiscal indicator
I used final government consumption expenditures deflated by the price level
proxy as the fiscal indicator. I used the cyclical component of the index as
my real government spending surprise indicator (gsDt). Figure 6 depicts
a relationship between the real output gap and real government spending
surprise.7
Booming commodity prices (1976-1979)
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Figure 6: Co-movements: real economic activities and real government
spending surprise for the (WAEMU-7)
7Please refer to Table 9 for unit root tests.
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Fiscal policy is most effective in a fixed exchange rate regime, so we expect
our real government spending surprise indicator to be strongly correlated to
the real output gap. In fact, in Figure 6, we see a strong positive correla-
tion between real economic activities and real government spending; but the
interesting part is that government spending tends to be pro-cyclical. We
observe strong government spending during booming commodities prices and
weak government spending during adverse economic conditions.
Monetary policy indicators
In a fixed exchange rate regime, the money supply is determined exogenously.
Hence, we rely on this exogeneity principle in order to utilize the monetary
mass and M1 deflated by the price level proxy as our two exogenous monetary
policy indicators. I used the cyclical component of these two indicators as
my two exogenous monetary policy indicators (mmsDt) and (msDt).
8 We
see a strong and positive correlation between real economic activities and
real money surprise in Figure 7.
8Please refer to Table 9 for unit root tests.
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Figure 7: Correlation: real output gap and real money surprise
Exogenous supply instruments
Rainfall
I used monthly days of rainfall per year as my main proxy for rainfall. The
variable was stationary at level, which tells us that daily rainfall patterns
follow a random walk. However, I have also used the cyclical component of
the variable so as to capture the effect of rainfall surprise (rainst). We expect
a strong correlation between rainfall surprise and the real output gap and
since rainfall is a positive supply shock it should shift the short run aggregate
supply curve downward; putting downward pressure on inflation.
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Figure 8: Correlations: rainfall surprise, ex-post inflation, and the real output
gap.
We examine the correlation between rainfall surprise (rainst), the ex-
post inflation rate (INFRWD), and the real output gap (ogapt) in Figure 8.
We can see a positive relationship between the real output gap and rainfall
surprise; we also see a negative relationship between the ex-post inflation
rate and rainfall surprise.
Devaluation
I used the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 as a negative terms of trade
shock (devaluation1994) because the cost of imports rose rapidly during that
specific year; we expect to find a significant pass-through of the devaluation
on domestic inflation.
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Mark up proxy
I used the crude oil average spot prices deflated by the domestic price level
proxy as my proxy for the mark up. I converted the prices from US dollars to
CFA franc and then deflated the prices by the price level proxy. Real crude
oil inflation (goilDt) was calculated by using the first difference of the real
crude oil price index. Real crude oil price surprise (oilsDt) was calculated
by using the cyclical component of the real oil price index. The effect of the
1970s oil shocks were mildly felt across the WAEMU, but the strongest case
was the Togolese case. In Figure 9, we examine this case.9
(1973-1974) First oil shock
(1979) Second oil shock
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Figure 9: Correlation: real crude oil inflation (goilDt) and the exp-post
inflation rate (INFRWD) for Togo
9Please refer to Table 9 for unit roots tests.
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Foreign inflation index
This study uses France’s consumer price inflation (finft) as a proxy for
capturing the effect of an exogenous change in foreign inflation on domestic
inflation. Since the CFA franc has been pegged to France’s exchange rate
since 1948, it is likely that inflation across both countries would be strongly
correlated. We failed to satisfy the unit root test, but that was prior to
the identification of a structural break identified for the year of 1984. The
structural break could have been caused by the French authorities’ efforts
to curb inflation through forceful legislation at the onset of the 1980s series
of currency depreciations. In Figure 10, we plot the results of the unit root
test with breakpoints. The estimated ADF test statistic was found to be
-4.45 with a corresponding p-value of less than 0.02, allowing us to reject the
previous findings of a unit root in the series.
2.6 Empirical Results
2.6.1 WAEMU-7
Table 1 reports the first stage results estimated for the aggregated WAEMU-
7 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo). The
Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg tests for heteroskedasticity allowed us to
reject the presence of heteroskedasticity in all the estimated regressions (1-
8). In the first stage, the instrument relevance condition was satisfied in all
the estimated regressions (1-8). The tests of weak instruments also suggest
that the instruments are not weak. These results are based on the fact that
when we are willing to tolerate a rejection rate of 15 percent of a nominal 5
percent Wald test, we find that the the Cragg-Donald minimum eigenvalue
test statistic is greater than the test statistic associated with the nominal 5
percent Wald test.
Given the robustness of the diagnostic tests found in the first stage re-
sults, we found no surprises in the second stage results. Furthermore, all
directions of causality found between the instruments and the output gap
(ogapt) were as predicted by the theoretical framework. In models (1-8),
Rainfall surprise (rainst) is highly significant in explaining the real output
gap, which is is consistent with our theoretical claim that rainfall remains a
significant determinant of aggregate output for agriculture based economies.
The 1994 devaluation (devaluation1994) may have stabilized nominal output,
but our results show that it had a negative impact on the real output gap.
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As expected, our monetary policy indicators do play a significant role in
explaining demand; both (mmsD) and (msD) were found to be significant
in explaining the real output gap. The fiscal indicator was also significant
in explaining demand. (gsDt) was found to be statistically significant in
explaining the real output gap. (wogapDt) was found to be statistically sig-
nificant in explaining the real output gap, which implies that world demand
from the main trading partners is a significant determinant of domestic de-
mand. Commodity prices remain the anchor of growth for all the WAEMU;
we can clearly see that all the commodity price indicators were found to
be significantly robust in explaining demand. Real cocoa prices surprise
(cocoasDt), real tobacco prices surprise (tabasDt), and our commodity price
index (compexD) were found to be statistically significant in explaining the
real output gap. It is safe to conclude that the first stage results were con-
sistent across all estimated models (1-8).
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Table 2 reports the second stage results estimated for the WAEMU-7.10
The diagnostics tests support that the estimated regessions (1-8) were struc-
tured appropriately. This conclusion is based on the fact that we cannot re-
ject the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Hence,
we can conclude that the instruments are valid and that the models were
structured appropriately. Our estimates for the slope of the inverted short
run aggregate supply curve are statistically significant and the range of the
point estimates is from .37 to .54. These results are consistent with the
findings of Bhandari and Frankel (2015) in the case of India. The slope
is positive, suggesting that the short run aggregate supply curve is upward
sloping with a range of 1.85 to 2.70.
Given the range of the elasticities, it is safe to conclude that the short-
run aggregate supply curve could be relatively flat. As expected, rainfall
surprise puts downward pressure on inflation. There is a significant pass
through of imported oil inflation on domestic inflation. Crude oil inflation
(goilDt) was found to be statistically significant in explaining domestic in-
flation. Obviously, the 1994 devaluation has had a significant and positive
impact on domestic inflation. However, the effect was inelastic, which is a
desire result. Imported inflation from France (finf) was also found to be a
significant determinant of domestic inflation. The second stage results are
fairly consistent across the estimated regressions (1-8).
10We also report the second stage results estimated for the individual members of the
WAEMU for whom we found meaningful econometric results in the appendix.
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3 Conclusions
Overall, we can conclude that the sources of inflation in the WAEMU’s zone
emanate from real crude oil inflation, France’s inflation, rainfall, and the
output gap. The size of the effect of aggregate demand on domestic inflation
indicates that the short-run aggregate supply curve may be relatively flat;
suggesting that the economy maybe located in the excess capacity zone.
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Table 8: Augmented Dickey Fuller tests: inflation proxies
INFRWD Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -8.177 -2.955 0.000
Burkina Faso -7.586 -2.955 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -7.667 -2.955 0.000
Niger -7.667 -2.955 0.000
Senegal -7.917 -2.955 0.0000
Togo -8.594 -2.955 0.000
INFARMAD Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
WAEMU-7 -6.027 -2.955 0.000
Burkina Faso -5.847 -2.955 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -6.215 -2.955 0.000
Niger -5.513 -2.955 0.000
Senegal -5.549 -2.955 0.000
Togo -7.979 -2.955 0.000
INFMAD Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
WAEMU-7 -6.027 -2.955 0.000
Burkina Faso -7.314 -2.955 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -7.391 -2.955 0.000
Niger -7.462 -2.955 0.000
Senegal -7.312 -2.955 0.000
Togo -8.493 -2.955 0.000
INFRW Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
WAEMU-7 -8.177 -2.955 0.000
Burkina Faso -9.286 -2.955 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -7.707 -2.955 0.000
Niger -6.900 -2.955 0.000
Senegal -8.187 -2.955 0.000
Togo -7.816 -2.955 0.000
INFARMA Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
WAEMU-7 -6.027 -2.955 0.000
Burkina Faso -6.851 -2.955 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -6.273 -2.955 0.000
Niger -6.036 -2.955 0.000
Senegal -5.272 -2.955 0.000
Togo -6.192 -2.955 0.000
INFMA Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
WAEMU-7 -7.551 -2.955 0.000
Burkina Faso -7.972 -2.955 (0.00)
Cote d’Ivoire -6.945 -2.955 0.000
Niger -6.306 -2.955 0.000
Senegal -6.994 -2.955 0.000
Togo -7.144 -2.955 0.000
finft Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
France -1.116 -2.955 0.7087
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Table 9: Augmented Dickey Fuller tests: other variables
mmsDt or mmst Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.351 -2.952 0.0127
Burkina Faso -4.998 -2.952 (0.00)
Cote d’Ivoire -3.782 -2.952 0.0031
Niger -6.189 -2.952 0.000
Senegal -4.579 -2.952 0.0001
Togo -5.927 -2.952 0.000
msDt or mst Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.205 -2.952 0.0197
Burkina Faso -4.705 -2.952 0.0001
Cote d’Ivoire -3.962 -2.952 0.0016
Niger -3.316 -2.952 0.0142
Senegal -4.955 -2.952 0.000
Togo -5.118 -2.952 0.000
gsDt or gst Test statistic 5 percent critical value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.670 -2.952 0.0046
Burkina Faso -4.827 -2.952 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -4.684 -2.952 0.0001
Niger -3.889 -2.952 0.0021
Senegal -4.103 -2.952 0.0010
Togo -5.363 -2.952 0.000
rainst Test Statistic 5 percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -6.469 -2.952 0.000
Burkina Faso -7.151 -2.952 0.000
Cote d’Ivoire -6.084 -2.952 0.000
Niger -6.389 -2.952 0.000
Senegal -7.563 -2.952 0.000
Togo -6.684 -2.952 0.000
ogapt Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.011 -2.952 0.0339
Burkina Faso -5.233 -2.952 0.0000
Cote d’Ivoire -3.237 -2.952 0.0179
Niger -3.690 -2.952 0.0043
Senegal -5.424 -2.952 0.000
Togo -3.734 -2.952 0.0037
compexDt or compext Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.123 -2.952 0.0249
Burkina Faso -3.291 -2.952 0.0153
Cote d’Ivoire -2.656 -2.952 0.0820
Niger -2.966 -2.952 0.0381
Senegal -3.409 -2.952 0.000
Togo -3.132 -2.952 0.0243
cocoasDt or cocoast Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.795 -2.952 0.0030
Burkina Faso -3.878 -2.952 0.0022
Cote d’Ivoire -3.688 -2.952 0.0043
Niger -3.668 -2.952 0.0046
Senegal -4.146 -2.952 0.0008
Togo -3.656 -2.952 0.0048
tabasDt or tabast Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.952 -2.952 0.0017
Burkina Faso -4.038 -2.952 0.0012
Cote d’Ivoire -3.578 -2.952 0.0062
Niger -4.021 -2.952 0.0013
Senegal -4.033 -2.952 0.0012
Togo -4.161 -2.952 0.000
wogapDt or wogapt Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.796 -2.952 0.0030
Burkina Faso -4.047 -2.952 0.0012
Cote d’Ivoire -3.377 -2.952 0.0118
Niger -3.838 -2.952 0.0025
Senegal -3.788 -2.952 0.0030
Togo -3.908 -2.952 0.0020
goilDt or goilt Test Statistic 5 Percent Critical Value P-value
WAEMU-7 -3.796 -2.952 0.0030
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Figure 10: France’s Inflation (CPI): unit roots test with break points results
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